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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of pre-
emptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial is-
sue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new genera-
tion of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and con-
trol, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artil-
lery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most central-
ized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “su-
preme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear re-
lease authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bol-
ster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventional-
missile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regard-
ing the question of “no first use” and
nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness lev-
els, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nu-
clear posture. As such, it demands the




Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Deception: Unor-
thodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China.
New York: Basic Books, 2007. 489pp. $29.95
Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chi-
nese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contempo-
rary Chinese literature, as well as mod-
ern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Draw-
ing on the classic works of Chinese mil-
itary thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox ap-
proaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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Chinese states were using “all elements of
national power” several millennia ago.)
The reader can conclude from this work
that Chinese military thought places de-
ception on an equal level with fire and
maneuver. In this it differs from Western
military thought, which fundamentally
considers deception as “unsportsman-
like” and relegates it to the operational
and intellectual fringes. Deception and
unorthodox approaches afford ways for
the inferior to defeat the superior force.
The “stronger” force, as judged by con-
ventional military standards, is not nec-
essarily more likely to win in battle.
Rather, the force that applies the ortho-
dox and the unorthodox in a way that
fits the situation better is more likely to
prevail. The book abounds with exam-
ples of how a little deception or uncon-
ventional application can have a great
effect on outcomes.
The relationship between military oper-
ations and statecraft is another funda-
mental thread through this book.
Subversion of an enemy state begins
well before military conflict, and ideally
it makes conflict unneeded. Bribery, as-
sassination (both physical and charac-
ter), dissension, and distraction are all
basic tools of statecraft, as well as of war.
Fundamentally, Chinese thought makes
no real distinction between the two.
The final chapters address the ongoing
renaissance of traditional Chinese mili-
tary thought in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The once-despised classic
works are now widely used in PLA
institutions.
Several years ago, two PLA officers pub-
lished a book, Unrestricted Warfare,
that describes unconventional ap-
proaches for defeating a superior force.
In light of Sawyer’s new work, Western
scholars should reinterpret Unrestricted
Warfare. Rather than being an excep-
tion to PLA military thought, it may
well reflect current, core thinking.
Sawyer argues that “China has a lengthy
heritage of conceiving and implement-
ing systemic programs for subverting
other states.” It would be interesting for
scholars of contemporary Chinese di-
plomacy to compare the “active mea-
sures” stratagems outlined in the book
against current U.S.-China events.
This book reads well. A dynastic chro-
nology helps place the events in histori-
cal (Chinese, if not world) context.
However, maps would have greatly as-
sisted understanding.
JOHN R. ARPIN
Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia
Shirk, Susan. China, Fragile Superpower: How
China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful
Rise. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.
336pp. $27
According to Susan Shirk, China suffers
terribly from the “wag the dog” syn-
drome. Shirk argues rather persuasively
that China is saddled with a host of in-
ternal problems, ranging from wide-
spread social unrest to rampant political
corruption, that have sharply intensi-
fied insecurities among Chinese leaders
with respect to their hold on power.
Such perceptions of vulnerability have
in turn heightened Chinese sensitivities
to slights by Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States, slights that accordingly
threaten to arouse potentially uncon-
trollable national passions and, in the
process, stimulate regime-toppling im-
pulses at home. For Shirk, this volatile
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